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Quick dissemination of information about new vulnerabilities and attacks is essential to time-critical handling of
threats in information security, but little systematic tracking has been done of it.  We are developing data mining
techniques to track the flow of such information by comparing important information-security Web sites, alert
messages, and strings in packets to find similar words and sentences.  We report on tools we have developed to
collect relevant sentences, with a particular focus on comparing sentences from different sources to find patterns of
quotation and influence.  We report results on some representative pages that indicate some surprising information
flows, for which the combination of both word matching and structure matching performed significantly better than
either alone.  We also report on preliminary work on the front lines of cyber-attack, trying to correlate text in
intrusion-detection reports and even attack packets observed on a honeypot with reports of known attacks.  These
methods could help us automatically locate relevant fixes quickly when being attacked.  Our tools will in general
enable better design of incident response and incident reporting requirements for organizations, by showing
bottlenecks and unused capabilities in the management of vulnerabilities and attacks.
 
This paper appeared in the International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Bellevue,
Washington, June 2008.
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1. Introduction
 
Availability of knowledge of new vulnerabilities and attacks is critical in maintaining security and integrity of
computer systems.  We have been exploring how such information is transmitted between Internet sites.  Studying
this is important because it is an essential kind of intelligence gathering for potential hacker and even information-
warfare attacks.  It is important that channels of information dissemination be efficient in crisis situations, especially
for widespread or self-propagating attacks.  Without a good understanding of how the channels work, we also cannot
improve them very well or develop priority schemes for incident response (Yuill et al, 2000).  (Browne et al, 2001)
reports that most attacks occur long after security patches are available due to the lack of awareness by system
administrators, so better dissemination of attack intelligence should be a high priority.
While some work has been done on “insecurity flow” within software (Moskowitz & Kang, 1997), little
systematic attention has been paid to flow of text descriptions of vulnerabilities and attacks concerning software. 
Proposed languages for reporting vulnerabilities (like OVAL, oval.mitre.org, or that proposed by (Tian et al, 2004))
provide a standardized structure but using them is an imposition on busy system administrators.  It would be much
more user-friendly to exploit the many bug reports and vulnerability announcements that are already produced in
prose.  Studies have shown that good dissemination of vulnerability information does not harm systems much, at
least as much as dissemination of patches (Arora, Nandkumar, and Telang, 2006).
From our experience we postulate an overall information flow in Figure 1 (Iyer et al, 2003).  Attacks are caught
by intrusion detection systems, leading system administrators to inspect packets more thoroughly to gain further
information.  Informal sites like Bugtraq collect reports of system administrators, and broker sites like that for the
CVE examine the reports and decide whether to issue a number to the vulnerability and associated (perhaps
hypothetical) attack.  Further brokers like CERT and other security-practitioner sites then examine the continuing
discussion, contact software vendors, and try to provide a definitive statement about the vulnerability and its
countermeasures.  Note that flow analysis is independent of disclosure issues (Farrow, 2000) since flow can be
proprietary or public depending on the kind of information.
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To examine the current flow of security information, we have developed a number of Java and Python tools to
data mine information-security information based on word matching.  Earlier prototypes done by students
(McVicker, Avellino, & Rowe, 2007) showed promising results from just text keyword matching, so we made that a
first step.
2.1 Finding relevant Web sites and matching them
One set of experiments tried to find sentences on the Web mentioning vulnerability information and correlated
them to infer who was reading whom.  This required our writing first a tool in Java to query Google and Alta Vista
and find a set of pages matching a set of vulnerability-associated keywords.  In the most extensive experiments
reported here, we used the keywords "vulnerability," "ICMP," "packets," "flags," and "footprinting" in an attempt to
collect information about ICMP footprinting.  We supplemented these links with all outgoing links from those pages
whose link text mentioned at least one keyword.  Secondly, we wrote a tool to examine the sentences of the found
pages to find individual sentences matching the keywords.  Only sentences with a weighted match to the keywords
exceeding a threshold were returned. The weighting was an estimation of the inverse document frequency: the
logarithm of the ratio of the number of occurrences of a word in a sample corpus to the number of occurrences of the
given word in the corpus.  HTML and other formatting data were removed from sentences before matching. 
Sentences were carefully delimited using a list of 47 possible sentence-ending patterns.  One program analyzed
HTML and related formats using a detailed knowledge of HMTL tags; another extracted text from PDF files using
the pyPDF utility (cheeseshop.python.org/pypi/pyPdf/1.6).  Both used a detailed model of Web URL formats to
interpret links and fill in their details.  As an example, for the query keywords "ICMP vulnerability flags
footprinting", a top-rated sentence at 0.41 was in www.opennet.ru/ base/summary/1055867893_2296.txt.html: "An
attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a simple TCP packet to with the FIN-ACK flags set to a vulnerable
machine."
Once sentences were extracted, we compared every pair from different Web sites to find related sentences. 
(Intrasite copying and citation is common and mostly uninteresting.)  This took some time.  A threshold of match
similarity for output is used based on the weighted sum of the words in common, with the same weighting used
previously, but with an extra weight given to connections between sentences of pages having an explicit link
between them.  We set the threshold to five standard deviations above the mean match score on the extracted
sentences, using the mean match score to approximate the mean since the distribution was very close to a Poisson
distribution.  For example, for the 4692 top pages for the "ICMP flags footprinting" keywords, the mean match score
was 0.0488 and the standard deviation was 0.479 (they would be equal for an ideal Poisson distribution).  (For the
10,000 top candidates matching 23 keywords associated with insider attacks on computer systems, the mean match
score was 0.0400 and the standard deviation was 0.0355.)  For the ICMP keywords we used a threshold of 0.25 for
match filtering and obtained 35,448 matches.  Connections were sorted so the earlier page (judged by its
"LastModified" date) came first in the output to enable construction of directed graphs of influence.
We separately tabulated exact matches and inexact matches; the latter were almost always much more common. 
An example exact sentence match (clearly not a coincidence) rated at 0.604 was between
www.unix.org.ua/rfc/bcp0060.html and www.faqs.org/rfcs/bcp/bcp60.html of "Unfortunately, a number of firewalls
and load-balancers in the current Internet send a reset in response to a TCP SYN packet that use flags from the
Reserved field in the TCP header."  An example inexact sentence match rated at 0.54 was between the sentences
"Remote attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities to create a denial of service condition, or to execute arbitrary
code on an affected server" and "A remote to unauthenticated attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to execute
arbitrary code or cause a denial of service on an affected system" found on www.juniper.net/security/auto/
vulnerabilities/vuln2558.html and astro.berkeley.edu/~central/ archive/us-cert respectively.  In both cases we judged
that information flow was from the first page to the second.
We wrote a routine to cluster this data to identify patterns of influence.  A threshold argument permits clustering
at different levels of detail to see different phenomena.  We also summed the ratings for all sentence pairs found
between two sites to get a site-pair rating of the degree of information flow.  As an example of output, the top-rated
inferred flows for the ICMP query were as follows.  Some transitivity-like phenomena are apparent, since if site A is
similar to site B, and site B is similar to site C, then A is similar to C.
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34.966: www.ecst.csuchico.edu to www.yolinux.com
34.943: www.e-infomax.com to www.ecst.csuchico.edu
34.943: www.ecst.csuchico.edu to www.uni-kiel.de
34.943: www.linuxdig.com to www.ecst.csuchico.edu
31.713: docs.mandragor.org to www.ecst.csuchico.edu
31.696: www.ecst.csuchico.edu to www.arameya.com
28.713: www.e-infomax.com to www.uni-kiel.de
28.713: www.linuxdig.com to www.e-infomax.com
28.713: www.linuxdig.com to www.uni-kiel.de
28.710: www.e-infomax.com to www.yolinux.com
28.710: www.linuxdig.com to www.yolinux.com
28.710: www.uni-kiel.de to www.yolinux.com
28.426: www.cs.wisc.edu to www.ecst.csuchico.edu
27.397: docs.mandragor.org to www.arameya.com
26.796: docs.mandragor.org to www.e-infomax.com
26.796: docs.mandragor.org to www.linuxdig.com
26.796: docs.mandragor.org to www.uni-kiel.de
26.793: docs.mandragor.org to www.yolinux.com
26.793: www.e-infomax.com to www.arameya.com
26.793: www.linuxdig.com to www.arameya.com
26.793: www.uni-kiel.de to www.arameya.com
26.788: www.arameya.com to www.yolinux.com
24.035: docs.mandragor.org to www.cs.wisc.edu
24.032: www.cs.wisc.edu to www.arameya.com
23.792: www.armware.dk to www.faqs.org
23.783: www.faqs.org to ietfreport.isoc.org
23.783: www.unix.org.ua to www.faqs.org
23.755: www.ietf.org to www.faqs.org
 
2.2 Classification of sentence similarities
Two sentences on two pages may be similar for several reasons.  Exact matches are usually beyond the limits of
coincidence.  Exact matches could be:
·                     Normal routine copying of pages, as when a Web site collects important papers on security.    The "TCP
SYN" exact match given above can be inferred to be an example of the first because the page names are also
similar, bcp0060.html and bcp60.html.  Pages with numerous high-similarity sentences strongly support this
hypothesis.
·                     Common authorship on sites.  We excluded matching of sentences within the same site (the same
domain), but businesses often buy multiple site names to appeal to different audiences.  An example is an exact
match between www.demboo.info/Carbon-cheats.htm and www.mulax.info/Sims-cheats.htm of the sentence "For
walkthroughs, cheats and tips call 09067 53 54 55 This is a fully automated system that provides gameplay hints
and playing tips for most of the games in the Electronic Arts range."  A high site-pair rating of similar sentences
supports this hypothesis, but it can be distinguished from routine copying by having significantly different file
names between those of similar sentences.
·                     Acknowledged citation, particularly if the text is quoted or indented.  This rarely occurred in our security
pages, but occurs much more with traditional journalism.  This can be distinguished by introductory words in a
previous sentence such as "says", "explains", "stated", "according to", "further information", etc.
·                     Plagiarism, not as uncommon as one would hope.  Of course, security crises can require getting accurate
information out quickly, and copying someone's words without citation may occur.  We did not see any obvious
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examples in our test cases, but they would be hard to prove.
·                     "Boilerplate", formalized statements to accomplish some legal or policy objective.  For instance,
www.securiteam.com/securitynews/5RP0E204UA.html has "Additional Information: For the most up-to-date
information regarding these vulnerabilities, please visit the CERT/CC Vulnerability Notes Database at:
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/" and "Please note that the test results summarized above should not be interpreted as
a statement of overall software quality.", and both sentences also occur in astro.berkeley.edu/~central/archive/us-
cert.  Boilerplate can be inferred from the use of particular words such as "information", "please visit", "please
note", and "should not be interpreted".
 
Inexact matches between sentences on different pages could be:
·            Common authorship on sites.  For instance, www.konde.info/Nothing-cheats.htm says "IGN is the ultimate
Spider-Man: The Movie resource for trailers, screenshots, cheats , walkthroughs ... " and
www.mulax.info/Games-cheats.htm says "IGN PS2 is the ultimate resource for PlayStation 2 trailers,
screenshots, cheats, walkthroughs ... ".  It is unlikely that anyone other than the same author would have strung
those four particular nouns in succession at the end.
·            Acknowledged citation.  For instance, cert.pol34.pl/news/annall.htm has the sentence "According to
Microsoft Advisory (935423), in order for this attack to be carried out, a user must either visit a Web site that
contains a Web page that is used to exploit the vulnerability or view a specially crafted e-mail message or email
attachment sent to them by an attacker."  This is usually signaled by introductory words in the sentence.
·            Acknowledged paraphrase.  For example, cert.pol34.pl/news/annall.htm says "According to the US-CERT
there is publicly available exploit code for multiple vulnerabilities in Sun Java Runtime Environment (JRE)" and
astro.berkeley.edu/~central/archive/us-cert says "Publicly available exploit code exists for this vulnerability, and
US-CERT has monitored incident reports that indicate that this vulnerability is being actively exploited."
·            Unacknowledged paraphrase.  We see much that looks like this, though is hard to prove.  It often occurs in
attempts to translate more technical language into more accessible language.
·            Boilerplate, such as required legal notices.  For instance, many pages at
astro.berkeley.edu/~central/archive/us-cert begin with "Further information is available in the following US-
CERT Vulnerability Note".
·            Accidental similarities.  These can occur with commonly repeated language.  For instance,
www.freerepublic.com/focus/keyword?k=msie says "An attacker could use a specially crafted web page to
exploit the vulnerability and take control of a system, warned Danish security firm Secunia" and
astro.berkeley.edu/~central/archive/us-cert says "An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by using specially
crafted network traffic, by convincing you to click on a specially crafted URL, or by convincing you to open a
specially crafted Office document".  But it is unlikely that the two sentences are referring to the same
vulnerability, since they are both describing Web client vulnerabilities in a general way; previous sentences on
their pages distinguish their motivating subjects more precisely.
3. Structure-based sentence matching
 
To explore security-assertion matching in more detail, we conducted additional experiments with the pages and
sentences found in our first experiments.  Many authors have distinctive styles of sentence structure. For example,
one author may prefer multiple adjectives within a sentence while another may prefer prepositional phrases. The
occurrence and frequency of adjectival and prepositional phrases can define an author’s writing style.  This idea is
currently being used to detect pseudonymous writing (Rao & Rohtagi, 2000).  When authors of vulnerability and
attack information copy or use preexisting documents as templates, they preserve the characteristic style of the
original author, and this may be detectable.
3.1 Mining methodology
For these experiments we used the Python programming language because of its ease and flexibility in working
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with text strings, the free availability of several useful modules for performing web-mining functions, and our
experience with the Python-based Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) for NLP routines (Sourceforge, 2007).  Useful
in particular were the mechanize and BeautifulSoup modules. The mechanize module provides a means
for programmatic web browsing and allowed us to retrieve and iterate over Web pages. The BeautifulSoup
module is a HTML/XML parser that can compensate for invalid markup structure and provides navigation, search,
and modification functions for the parse tree. We used it to extract specific data elements from a parsed forum page.
In these experiments we focused on extracting data from two sources: vulnerability note entries from Carnegie-
Mellon’s CERT database, and posts from the Bugtraq computer security forum operated on the SecurityFocus
website owned by Symantec Corporation. As an archive of a high-volume mailing list, Bugtraq’s forum contains
early notification and discussion of new security vulnerabilities, while the CERT database contains descriptions of
vulnerabilities that have been formally verified and written up by the CERT. Accordingly, we expected that a new
vulnerability would first be reported in the Bugtraq forum, and then, once verified, appear in the CERT database. 
We wanted to trace the information vector from initial vulnerability indication to verification and resolution.
3.2 Comparisons
The data retrieved from the CERT and Bugtraq entries had few undocumented relationships.  There were
approximately 2,500 entries in the CERT database and 25,750 in the Bugtraq forum that matched seven test topics
we selected.  Based on these results, we elected to build a test set for our comparison algorithms on a larger
previously collected data set that contained sentences resulting from a search on insider security attacks. In this data
set were 7,085 sentence pairs, which were read and manually categorized as being related or unrelated.
Our methodology was to use low-level natural-language processing to provide information about the part-of-
speech sequence in the sentences (nouns, verbs, articles, adjectives, etc. and their ordering).  We utilized an N-Gram
tagger provided by the NLTK to determine the parts of speech of sentence tokens (typically words) (Jurafsky &
Martin, 2000).  It tags a token based on that token and its N-1 predecessor tokens. It assigns a tag by looking up the
most likely tag for the sequence of tokens and tags based on the data on which it was trained.  We trained trigram,
bigram, and unigram taggers using the Wall Street Journal data subset of the Penn Treebank.  The trigram tagger was
the primary tagger since it provided the most context for tagging individual tokens.  The trigram tagger backed off
(that is, resorted) to first the bigram and then the unigram tagger when there was insufficient data for a three-token
sequence.  The unigram tagger backed off to a regular expression tagger and then a default tagger.  The regular
expression tagger attempted to provide correct tags for regularly occurring tokens such as dates, gerunds, simple past
tense verbs, and URLs.
To compare two sentences, several algorithms were implemented and compared (see Figure 2).  We used the f-
score (the geometric mean of recall and precision) as our performance metric.   The first method ("Keywords")
calculated only the ratio of common keywords in both sentences.  The second method ("TS") calculated the ratio of
common tags and tag bigrams in both sentences.  The third method ("TTS") multiplied the number from the second
method with the ratio of tokens in common between the two sentences.  For this method, tokens that were tagged as
articles, conjunctions, and pronouns were ignored since they occur fairly often.  For the final method ("TTS-A"), the
ratio of similar tags, tokens, and bigram tags were averaged together.  This provided a more comprehensive metric
since it included the similarity weighing the words in the sentence, the type of words in the sentence, and the
structure of the sentence (captured by the tag bigrams) equally.
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appeared quite successful in detecting similarity between two sentences.  Since many security-related websites use
well-formed English to describe the potential bug or security vulnerability, the Wall Street Journal data proved
adequate for tagging these sentences.  Where regularly formed English was not found, the unigram tagger provided
the most likely tag given that word.
Figure 2 shows our final algorithm TTS-A achieved its highest f-score of .83, when precision was .96 and recall
.73.  Figure 3 shows more details of the tradeoff between recall and precision.  Compared to keyword matching
alone, this is a 37% increase in recall for the same level of precision.  Surprisingly, our algorithm achieved over 99%
precision with 50% recall.  This indicates that just looking at the tokens, their tags, and a partial ordering of the tags
suffices to establish a correlation.
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Figure 3: Recall-precision curve for the 7000 test sentence pairs.
 
The sentences for which comparison of tokens, tags, and structure correctly identified the match or lack thereof
while keywords alone did not largely appear to be those in which a particular substring was common to both
sentences.  An example is the pair with the accidental substring "that bundles together many different malware
tools":
·         "MPack is a powerful kit that bundles together many different malware tools."
·         "The kit is a professionally developed collection of back-end web components built on PHP that bundles
together many different malware tools."
Structure matching permits matching to be more tolerant to parsing errors.  For example in the below pair, the
comprehensive matching correctly predicts a relationship between the two sets of text even though the parsing
algorithm failed to properly parse the text into the correct set of sentences.
·         "It monitors global risks and threats including global warming, terrorism, cybercrime, economic
espionage, etc. It champions security at home and at work."
·         "It monitors global risks and threats including global warming, terrorism, national disasters and health
emergencies, cybercrime, economic espionage, etc. It also analyses issues and trends in the struggle for
geopolitical hegemony, the pursuit of energy security and environmental security, the cultivation of
human rights, and the strengthening of democratic institutions."
Another interesting result is that with a threshold of about 0.45, the token, tag, and structure method achieves a
1.0 for precision and approximately 0.66 for recall on our test set.  Any pair of sentences achieving a score above 0.7
means that one sentence is a direct copy of the other with some minor errors in parsing or punctuation.
Figures 4 and  5 show histograms of all the scores assigned to the 7000 sentence pairs.  95% of the pairs received
scores below 0.3, indicating a low probability of a match.  The peak in scores between 0 and 0.2 represents random
coincidences of nouns, articles, and verbs.
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Figure 4: Histogram of scores for combined matching of tokens, tags, and structure.
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Figure 5: Histogram of scores for keyword matching alone.
 
It was difficult to confirm the relationship of many pairs receiving scores between 0.3 and 0.45. For example, the
sentences below which scored 0.44 discuss a Zogby poll on the same subject. Particularly intriguing is that these
sentences are using the same poll and the number is different, whether accidentally or deliberately.
·         "A Zogby poll of New Yorkers' opinions about the 9/11 investigation, released last month, indicated that
49 percent of New York City residents and 41 percent of New York state residents believed that some
federal officials 'knew in advance that attacks were planned on or around September 11, 2001, and that
they consciously failed to act.'"
·         "Consider another Zogby poll from August 2004, which found that 63 percent of New Yorkers under 30
believe some U.S. leaders 'knew in advance that attacks were planned on or around September 11, 2001,
and that they consciously failed to act.'"
 
Of particular interest were sentence pairs where all algorithms failed to see that the sentences were related (Figure
6).  Many of these sentences appear to be completely different in structure even though they discuss identical
subjects. Higher-level processing with full parser may be necessary to recognize such pairs.  Particularly helpful
might be to focus on noun-noun references as this has been very helpful in parsing captions (Guglielmo & Rowe,





Sentence 1                                                                           Sentence 2
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"One strain of scam email makes the bogus
claim that recipients have won one of the
much sought after devices in a bid to trick
prospective marks into visiting a malware
loaded site."
"Email recipients are sent a bogus email
informing them that they have won a new
iPhone, in reality the email contained malware
designed to subvert and compromise the user's
computer."
"NanoScan is a rapid, light scanner that
currently detects over 750,000 active viruses,
spyware, Trojans and other malware within
just one minute."
"Panda Software has launched the mini,
customisable version of NanoScan, the instant
virus scanner from Panda Software, designed to
detect active malware on a PC in less than one
minute."
"According to a 2005 FBI Cyber Crime
Study, 90 percent of small businesses had at
least one cyber security incident within the
past year."
"In fact, of the 500 companies that responded to
a recent FBI survey, 90 percent said they'd had a
computer security breach, and 80 percent of
those said they'd suffered financial loss as a
result."
"Using ideological attraction, the Soviets
successfully recruited many high-level
spies."
"At that time period the Soviets recruited their
spies using ideological motivation."
Figure 6: Sentence pairs where our structure-matching methods fail.
 
4. Correlating attack reports with packets
 
A final step in using descriptive information about attacks is in correlating it to the details of observed attacks.  If
we can automate the latter as well as the indexing of resource sites such as those of Bugtraq and the CERTs, we
could recognize attacks automatically within a second after they occur in a more general way than that provided by
intrusion-detection systems.  This would be helpful since, as (Lai & Hsia, 2007) points out, many administrators are
too busy to do anything about their vulnerabilities until they receive attack reports.
A good way to accomplish this last step is to continuously collect attack data on a honeypot, a computer
deliberately intended for no purpose other than to be attacked.  We have done some first steps in exploring this using
a honeypot we have been running to study deception methods (Rowe and Goh, 2007).  Honeypots provide plenty of
data about common untargeted attack methods on the Internet, its "background radiation" (Pang et al, 2004).
4.1 Intrusion alert records
Two useful kinds of data obtainable from a machine under attack are the record of suspicious events and the full
packet records.  An intrusion-detection system can provide the first kind for known attacks.  For instance, one record
from the Snort intrusion-detection system running on our honeypot was:
Date: 2007-09-12 Time: 15:46:56.148-07 Alert_code: 1394 Alert_description: SHELLCODE x86 NOOP 
IP_address_1: 89.26.217.22  Port_#_1: 4310 IP_address_2: 192.168.0.3 Port_#_2: 445 time_to_live: 118
 
These alerts are triggered by Snort production rules of a relatively simple syntax that are created by programmers
who study attack traffic.  Although there are periodic updates, it may take a while for a rule for a new attack to get
implemented.  However, there are a sufficient number of general rules that Snort and other intrusion-detection
system can trigger to recognize at least something in a new attack, because attacks often reuse parts of others.
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Snort alert codes are indexed with some reference information, sometimes to CERT or Bugtraq sites.  These can
be looked up at the Snort site and correlated with the information in their referents.  For instance, rule 1394 that
triggered the above alert has the following description at www.snort.org, providing a good number of useful
keywords for further lookup.
 
GEN:SID 1:1394
Message SHELLCODE x86 NOOP
Summary This event is generated when an attempt is made to possibly overflow a buffer.
The NOOP warning occurs when a series of NOOP (no operation) are found in a stream. Most buffer overflow
exploits typically use NOOPs sleds to pad the code.
Impact This might indicate someone is trying to use a buffer overflow exploit.  Full compromise of system is
possible if the exploit is successful.
Detailed Information This rule detects a large number of consecutive NOOP instructions used in padding
code. It's not specific to a particular service exploit, but rather used to try and detect buffer overflows in
general. It is common for buffer overflow code to contain a large sequence of NOOP instructions as it
increases the odds of successful execution of the useful shellcode. 
Affected Systems Any x86 programs.
Attack Scenarios An attacker uses a buffer overflow exploit which contains the following payload: 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 /bin/sh
Ease of Attack Simple.
False Positives High, This event may be generated by applications such as ftp and http 
when binary data is being transferred.  A false Positive can be generated if the snort sensor detects text from
an IRC client or any other application that passes data plaintext. The event is generated if snort detects several
(a) characters in a row - such as 'aaaaaaaaaa'.
4.2 Packet analysis
Since new attacks and even many well-known attacks may not trigger an alert system, we may need to find them
in the background traffic.  Text strings occur surprisingly often in attack traffic, and other strings can be constructed
from nontext data, though the text strings tend to be more fruitful since they come prechunked.  Two examples of
packet dumps from TCPDump on our honeypot were:
09/14-00:47:21.626361 131.120.18.41:53 -> 192.168.0.3:3559 UDP TTL:111 TOS:0x0
ID:15349 IpLen:20 DgmLen:145 Len: 117
47 59 81 83 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 67 63 06  GY...........gc.
5F 6D 73 64 63 73 08 55 53 4E 42 41 52 4F 4E 05  _msdcs.USNBARON.
6C 6F 63 61 6C 00 00 06 00 01 00 00 06 00 01 00  local...........
00 00 00 00 40 01 41 0C 52 4F 4F 54 2D 53 45 52  ....@.A.ROOT-SER
56 45 52 53 03 4E 45 54 00 05 4E 53 54 4C 44 0C  VERS.NET..NSTLD.
56 45 52 49 53 49 47 4E 2D 47 52 53 03 43 4F 4D  VERISIGN-GRS.COM
00 77 A1 C8 65 00 00 07 08 00 00 03 84 00 09 3A  .w..e..........:
80 00 01 51 80                                   ...Q.
 
09/16-22:43:13.038582 131.120.18.41:53 -> 192.168.0.4:1052
UDP TTL:111 TOS:0x0 ID:13512 IpLen:20 DgmLen:137 Len: 109
FF FA 81 83 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 08 64 6F 77  .............dow
6E 6C 6F 57 64 0D 77 69 6E 64 6F 77 73 75 70 64  nloWd.windowsupd
61 74 65 03 63 6F 6D 00 00 01 00 01 C0 15 00 06  ate.com.........
00 01 00 00 0E 10 00 35 03 6E 73 31 04 6D 73 66  .......5.ns1.msf
74 03 6E 65 74 00 06 6D 73 6E 68 73 74 09 6D 69  t.net..msnhst.mi
63 72 6F 73 6F 66 74 C0 23 77 A1 A5 3D 00 00 03  crosoft.#w..=...
84 00 00 02 58 00 09 27 C0 00 00 03 84           ....X..'.....
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Here the first two lines give the packet header information, the left side below gives the raw bytes in
hexadecimal, and the right side translates it into alphanumeric characters if possible.  The first packet refers to a low-
security site USNBARON that has been used for attacks, and the second refers to downloWd, a favorite hacker
spelling.  But not all the strings are interesting; the first packet also refers to nstld.verifsign-grs.com, a standard
address for checking certificates, and the second also refers to windowsupdate.com, the standard Windows updating
site.
We can connect these strings to attack intelligence by supplying them to a Web search engine.  In general, we can
look up any substantial character strings we find in a packet, including also the individual words like "root-servers",
"Verisign", and "msnht" above, in our databases of text about attacks created using the methods of sections 2 and 3
above.  Techniques can be similar to those of forensics on malicious code which also exploit hidden strings in the
code.  It does not matter whether the strings are functional in the attack or not – sometimes they are artifacts of the
attacker software, and sometimes they are just bragging – because they can all provide identification and
classification clues.  Even subtle word clues can help, like "MARB" and "MEOW"s in the following portion of a
packet we received.  Sure enough, doing a Google lookup on those two words finds a reference (Parker, 2004) which
explains their significance.
 
05 00 00 03 10 00 00 00 A8 06 00 00 E5 00 00 00  ................
90 06 00 00 01 00 04 00 05 00 06 00 01 00 00 00  ................
00 00 00 00 32 24 58 FD CC 45 64 49 B0 70 DD AE  ....2$X..EdI.p..
74 2C 96 D2 60 5E 0D 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  t,..`^..........
70 5E 0D 00 02 00 00 00 7C 5E 0D 00 00 00 00 00  p^......|^......
10 00 00 00 80 96 F1 F1 2A 4D CE 11 A6 6A 00 20  ........*M...j.
AF 6E 72 F4 0C 00 00 00 4D 41 52 42 01 00 00 00  .nr.....MARB....
00 00 00 00 0D F0 AD BA 00 00 00 00 A8 F4 0B 00  ................
20 06 00 00 20 06 00 00 4D 45 4F 57 04 00 00 00   ... ...MEOW....
A2 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 46  ...............F
38 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 46  8..............F
00 00 00 00 F0 05 00 00 E8 05 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
01 10 08 00 CC CC CC CC C8 00 00 00 4D 45 4F 57  ............MEOW
E8 05 00 00 D8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00  ................
 
The headers of attack packets also provide useful indexing words to the attack, particularly the packet-length
("Length"), time-to-live ("TTL"), type-of-service ("TOS"), and protocol-name (at the end of the first line) fields.  To
exploit these, we give the field name and the associated value as keywords.  IP addresses are useful since they can be
looked up in registry sites like the ARIN registry (www.arin.net) for information about what they are.  More specific
classification of the type of usage (such as the specific service using HTTP) can be obtained by simple methods of
approximate assembly of the packets, and this helps classify the attack.  Subtle clues in the packets can also be
learned by using techniques such as support-vector machines (Li, Wang, & Luo, 2006).  Further packet partitioning
can be done using techniques from digital forensics in extracting hidden files from disks (Garfinkel, 2007).
4.3 Keyword lookup
 
Once we have accumulated keywords from the attack description (with intrusion detection) or the packet itself,
we can find out what vulnerabilities and attacks are associated with them.  Many words used in attack packets are
common generic words, so it is important to eliminate them.  (In addition, we saw some true text messages on the
honeypot, such as those from UDP phishing.)  We can keep a list of such ignorable words much like stopword lists
used in conventional text data mining.  Currently we use one of 638 words (mostly from our previous data-mining
work but with some additions specific to packets), including prepositions, adverbs, adjectives, pronouns, and overly-
general nouns and verbs, as well as names of common Internet sites.  Example entries are “into”, “rather”, “entire”,
“ourselves”, “rather”, “order”, “fact”, “mr”, “root”, “windows”, “need”, “please”, “2007”, “Adobe”, and
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“Microsoft”.
As an experiment, we took 1,632,374 lines of TCPDump output from five days of our honeypot run in September
2005, which was about 14 megabytes of packet data.  We grouped together all consecutive packets with the same IP
addresses (source and destination) and port numbers, and extracted their text strings as sets, one per packet
sequence.  After eliminating stopwords, we obtained only 406 unique string sets averaging 5.7 words per set, each
characterizing an attack type or variant.  An example is "aof baronus gss ntlmssp usn".  Many pairs of these sets had
substantial overlap, like that between the previous example and "aof baronus gss mww ntlmssp usn vge yeo".  The
strings critical to attacks are those common to pairs.  A simple algorithm to get the critical strings is to successively
find pairs of sets which overlap in all but one string (corresponding to attack instances in which only one string
differed).  Applying this to the 406 sets from the experiment gave us 67 additional strings of significantly higher
precision.
Our remaining words can then be looked up in an index of vulnerability and attack information using the methods
of section 2.  For this lookup it is usually desirable to search for references that match the conjunction of terms rather
than the disjunction since most attacks depend on a specific conjunction of features in the packet to be effective, and
precision tends to be low for disjunctive queries with these kinds of words.  However, packets often form sequences
based on their originating IP address and ports.  Collecting all the strings for the packet sequences gives us large
numbers of keywords for which matches on only a significantly large subset should be sufficient.  To avoid missing
useful data, we should do lookups on both the individual packets and packet sequences.
What if we fail to find any reasonably specific vulnerability or attack information on a particular attack packet
sequence?  That can actually be good because we may be seeing a new attack.  We should be particularly interested
if unusual strings (as judged by frequency counts) occur in the packet strings, as these may be our first warning of




We have developed a variety of tools for data mining of vulnerability and attack information.  The next step is to
upscale our tools to collect a much larger chunk of the current information flow.  This will require some database
design and a bank of computers running continuously to fill the database.
The tools themselves need to be tuned.  With part-of-speech tagging, we could achieve better results than with
keyword matching alone, and the combination of the two worked even better.  We estimate that using even more
sophisticated natural-language processing techniques might improve the results and discover relational patterns not
evident with our current techniques.  In particular, semantic analysis (looking at the “meaning” of the text) would
provide the opportunity to discover related textual information even if a sentence were rewritten using a different
word structure and vocabulary. Some recent work has shown good results in detecting semantic entailment in two
separate pieces of text.
Information flow analysis of vulnerability and attack information can be used in a variety of dissemination
architectures.  It could support centralized reporting and dissemination, or it could support a peer-to-peer sharing of
new information (Baquero & Lopes, 2003), depending on the resources and philosophy of the users.  Identification
of new kinds of attacks in a protocol could at least prompt system administrators to disable service of the protocol on
their routers and other networking equipment, a simple approach that can immediately reduce attack damage
significantly (Lai & Hsia, 2007).  It could supply data for accurate modeling of vulnerability reporting (Browne et al,
2001).  It could also provide the necessary data for design of good randomization strategies for software based on
what vulnerabilities tend to be exploited (Iyer et al, 2003), or deception strategies (Rowe & Goh, 2007).  Detection
of new attack variants in packets could be worth money to its discovers since some organizations pay for new
exploits (Kannan, Telang, & Xu, 2004).
6. Conclusions
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We have developed parts of a new approach to real-time information security, an approach that automatically
recognizes text associated with attacks and correlates them with Web information about them.  This could provide
useful “information flow” analysis of how attack and vulnerability intelligence is created and disseminated,
indicating possible bottlenecks and redundancies.  It could also provide a basis for automatic real-time defense
against attacks even if not much is yet known about them.  But much work needs to be done to build the database of
significant size that will be necessary, and set up automatic updates to it.
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Appendix.  Example sentence matches
 
We show here some more examples (both successful and unsuccessful) of the sentence matching.  We give in
order the dates of the pages, the text of the pages, the URLs of the pages, and the rating we computed using both
keywords and structure matching.
 
Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Mon Nov 22 08:12:44 PST 2004
Symantec (2003) ?Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Sees Increase in Blended Threats, Vulnerabilities and
Internet Attacks
Press Release,?Symantec (2003) ?Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Sees Increase in Blended
Threats,Vulnerabilities and Internet Attacks?   
http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:BSGuNyNGVdIJ:www.nvpcug.org/Newsletter/7July05.pdf
http://secureflorida.org/clientuploads/C-SAFE/CSAFEcybersecuritymanual.pdf    
0.91751
 
Mon Jul 02 09:26:18 PDT 2007  
Tue Jul 03 15:10:02 PDT 2007   
Lack of Mac malware baffles experts - vnunet.com Apple's Mac OS X remains almost completely free of any sort of
malware threat despite several years of availability, a significant market share, and even an entire month dedicated to
pointing out its flaws.  
Apple's Mac OS X remains almost completely free of any sort of malware threat despite several years of availability,
a significant market share, and even an entire month dedicated to pointing out its flaws.
http://www.b12partners.net/mt/archives/macintosh/
http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2186013/dearth-mac-malware-continues     
0.91394
 
Mon Aug 20 13:57:51 PDT 2001           
Tue Jul 03 04:09:15 PDT 2007   
A debate has raged for some time over whether the major threat to system security arises from attacks by "insiders"
or by "outsiders." Insiders have been blamed for causing 70 to 80 percent of the incidents and most of the damage
(Lewis, 1998).           
Insiders have been blamed for causing 70 to 80 percent of the incidents and most of the damage (Lewis, 1998).    
http://www.aci.net/kalliste/tic.htm          
http://web.elastic.org/%7efche/mirrors/www.jya.com/tic.htm      
0.70866
 
Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Tue May 31 00:21:30 PDT 2005
Botnets or zombie networks are groups of computers that have been infected by malware that allow the malware to
control the infected PC and use it to send spam or launch distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.          
Zombie networks are groups of computers that have been infected by malware that allows the author to control the
infected PC and use it to send spam or launch DDoS attacks.
http://weblog.infoworld.com/techwatch/archives/cat_security.html
http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/isn/2005-May.txt         
0.68167
 
Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
7/22/13 10:36 AM13th ICCRTS: C2 for Complex Endeavors
Page 17 of 18http://faculty.nps.edu/ncrowe/oldstudents/vulrecon_iccrts08.htm
Adware Installation Trick 3: Outright Lying How it works: malware may even be labeled as something else entirely,
such as a well-known piece of software or a crucial component of the computer operating system.  
Adware Installation Trick 1: Piggybacking How it works: malware may come bundled with a legitimate piece of





Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Fri Aug 12 18:42:55 PDT 2005  
In the first quarter of 2007, security firm Sophos PLC identified 23,864 new malware threats, more than double the
9,450 the company found in the same period last year.      
The firm reported last week that it had detected 7,944 new pieces of such malware in the first six months of this year
? almost 60 percent more than the same time last year.    
http://203.29.124.140/feed/single/21       
http://www.cwalsh.org/isnd/archives/2005_07.html         
0.46503
 
Thu Mar 27 02:20:40 PST 2003 
Tue May 31 00:21:30 PDT 2005
In the paper statistics can be found on computer crime vulnerabilities, computer crime incidents, computer security
incidents, malicious attacks, etc. which could include crimes, attempts at crimes, etc. but probably also non-criminal
conduct.
These fix some vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by malicious people to conduct cross-site scripting attacks,
bypass certain security restrictions, gain knowledge of potentially sensitive information and compromise a user's
system.  
http://www.ulapland.fi/home/oiffi/enlist/resources/HeuniWeb.htm
http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/isn/2005-May.txt         
0.42534
 
Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Botnet computers are machines (generally running one of the notoriously insecure Windows OSes) that are infected
with malicious software that lets criminals use them to send spam and launch denial-of-service attacks as part of
extortion rackets.           
Botnets or zombie networks are groups of computers that have been infected by malware that allow the malware to
control the infected PC and use it to send spam or launch distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.          
http://boingboing.net/2007_05_01_archive.html
http://weblog.infoworld.com/techwatch/archives/cat_security.html           
0.41331
 
Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Tue Jul 03 15:00:37 PDT 2007   
New Scam Targets Bank Customers (Click for story) SANS Internet Storm Center is reporting on a new strain of IE
Malware.           
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Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Using malware or software designed to infiltrate a computer system, hackers steal account information for users of
MMO games and then sell off virtual gold, weapons and other items for real money.      
The computer then becomes part of a bot network, which can then be used to launch denial of service attacks, install
keylogging software and steal personal account information and other malicious activities.
http://www.futurebrief.com/security2006.asp     
http://weblog.infoworld.com/techwatch/archives/cat_security.html           
0.38138
 
Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 PST 1969
Fri Oct 28 15:11:32 PDT 2005   
Moreover, only 4 percent of the successful DoD attacks were noticed by network administrators, and only a small
percentage of those detected were reported to authorities.   
Thirty percent of respondents have no clue as to how many attacks their network was subjected to in the past year,
and 22 percent do not know how many successful attacks transpired at that time.           
http://www.ecommerce-guide.com/news/trends/print.php/7761_504441
http://www.umsl.edu/%7esauter/spam/index2.html         
0.36669  
